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DISCRIMINATIO N
May Private Individuals Sue
a State That Establishes
English-Only Policies?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 176-180. © 2000 American Bar Association.
Editor's Note: The respondent's
brief in this case was not available
by PREVIEW's deadline.
ISSUE
When Congress enacted Section 602
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, did it intend to authorize
individuals to bring a private action
against states under disparate
impact regulations promulgated
by federal agencies pursuant to
Title VI?
FACTS
Alabama has historically adminis-
tered its driver's license examina-
tion in a number of foreign lan-
guages. From the 1970s to 1991, the
Alabama Department of Public
Safety ("Department") administered
the examination in at least 14 for-
eign languages, including Spanish,
Korean, Farsi, Cambodian, German,
Laotian, Greek, Arabic, French,
Japanese, Polish, Thai, and
Vietnamese. On July 13, 1990, an
English-only amendment to the
Alabama Constitution (Amendment
509) was ratified. That amendment
provided that English is the official
language of the state of Alabama.
About one year later, the
Department adopted an English-
only policy, requiring that all
portions of the driver's license
examination process, including the
written examination, be adminis-
tered in English only. The policy
officially forbade the use of inter-
preters, translation dictionaries,
and other interpretive aids. The
Department's official policy still pro-
vides special accommodations for
illiterate, hearing-impaired, deaf,
and disabled applicants. The
Department also permits non-
English speaking drivers from other
states and foreign countries to
exchange valid out-of-state licenses
for an Alabama license without tak-
ing the written examination.
After the new policy was imple-
mented, the Alabama Attorney
General issued an opinion conclud-
ing that Amendment 509 requires
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all applicants for driver's licenses to
take the examination in English.
The opinion acknowledged that the
English-only policy "might be a vio-
lation of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964," but that considera-
tions of safety and integrity of the
licensing process would support a
requirement that the driver's license
examinations be given in English.
In December 1996, Martha Sandoval
filed a class action suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District
of Alabama against the Department
and its director on behalf of herself
and others similarly situated. She
claimed that the English-only policy
constituted discrimination on the
basis of national origin in violation
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-
4) and its implementing regulations,
as well as the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States
Constitution.
After a trial without a jury, the dis-
trict court entered a permanent
injunction prohibiting the
Department's enforcement of the
policy and ordered the Department
to make reasonable accommoda-
tions for non-English speakers who
applied for a driver's license. 7
F.Supp.2d 1234 (M.D.Ala. 1996).
The district court found that the
policy was adopted as a pretext
for discrimination and that the
Department had intentionally
discriminated on the basis of
national origin.
The Department appealed the judg-
ment to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit. The
Department argued that the lawsuit
was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, that Section 602 of
Title VI does not contain an implied
private cause of action and that an
English-language policy cannot con-
stitute unlawful national original
discrimination as a matter of law.
Affirming the district court, the
Eleventh Circuit held that there is
an implied private cause of action
under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to enforce federal regu-
lations prohibiting disparate-impact
discrimination against statutorily
protected groups. 211 F.3d 133
(11th Cir. 2000). Noting that
Sandoval had brought a disparate-
impact case, the court explained
that she must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that a facially
neutral practice has a disproportion-
ate adverse effect on a group pro-
tected by Title VI. Once a prima
facie showing is made, the court
said, the Department must prove
that a substantial justification exists
for the challenged practice. The
court stated that if the Department
meets this burden, Sandoval may
still prevail by demonstrating that a
comparably effective alternative
practice exists that would result in
less disproportionality, or that the
Department's proffered justification
is a pretext for discrimination.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that
the Department's policy of adminis-
tering its driver's license examina-
tion only in English had a disparate
impact on the basis of national ori-
gin in violation of Title VI. The
court reasoned that the policy
adversely affected non-English-
speaking residents in the form of
lost opportunities, social services,
and other quality of life pursuits,
noting that the vast majority of resi-
dents who could not obtain a
license were from a country other
than the United States. The
Eleventh Circuit pointed out that
the Department made special exam-
ination accommodations for other
statutorily protected groups such
as hearing-impaired, illiterate, and
disabled residents.
In holding that Title VI creates a
private implied cause of action
against states to enforce the dis-
parate impact regulations promul-
gated under Section 602, the
Eleventh Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's decisions in Lau v.
Nichols, 518 U.S. 187 (1996) and
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 63 U.S. 582 (1983).
According to the Eleventh Circuit,
the Supreme Court's decisions in
Lau, Guardians, and Alexander,
although not squarely addressing
the issue, logically supported an
implied private cause of action
under Section 602.
The Department asked the U.S.
Supreme Court to review the
Eleventh Circuit's decision. The
Supreme Court granted the
Department's petition for a writ of
certiorari. 121 S.Ct. 28 (2000).
CASE ANALYSIS
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §
2000d) prohibits any recipient of
federal financial assistance from dis-
criminating on the basis of race,
color, or national origin in any fed-
erally funded program. The
Supreme Court has recognized an
implied private cause of action to
enforce Section 601. See Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94
(1985); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 63 U.S. 582, 607
n.27 (1983).
Section 602 of Title VI authorizes
federal agencies to promulgate rules
and regulations effectuating Title VI.
The section contains three essential
parts. The first part delegates to fed-
eral agencies rule-making authority
to effectuate Section 601. The sec-
ond part provides agency guidelines
for obtaining compliance with
Section 601 and states that compli-
ance may be effected by termina-
tion of funding or by any other
(Continued on Page 178)
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means authorized by law. The third
part establishes a procedural rule
for determining noncompliance,
including notice to the state agency,
a requirement that the federal
agency first seek voluntary compli-
ance and a reporting mechanism for
alerting Congress that a federal
agency is considering termination of
federal funding. There is no express
provision in either Section 601 or
Section 602 for an independent pri-
vate-party enforcement action.
While Section 601 requires a plain-
tiff to establish the funding recipi-
ent's discriminatory intent, regula-
tions promulgated by the U.S.
Department of Justice and the U.S.
Department of Transportation pro-
hibit funding recipients from taking
any action that results in a dis-
parate impact or produces discrimi-
natory effects on the basis of race,
color, or national origin. The U.S.
Department of Transportation has
promulgated such regulations. The
parties concede that the Alabama
Department of Public Safety is sub-
ject to these regulations and that
the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion and the U.S. Department of
Justice may enforce these regula-
tions through proceedings to termi-
nate federal funding or to discontin-
ue financial assistance.
The parties disagree whether an
individual may enforce these
agency regulations without express
statutory authorization. Sandoval
relies on decisions in the Eleventh
Circuit and in seven other circuits
that found an implied right of pri-
vate action in Section 602 cases.
Sandoval also contends that
Supreme Court cases, while not
directly addressing the point,
have indicated that there is a right
to a private action for violation of
regulations promulgated under
Section. 602.
On the other hand, Alexander
argues that the Supreme Court in
United States v. Fordice overruled
the other Supreme Court cases
relied on by Sandoval. According to
the Department, in order to create a
private cause of action against states
in the context of legislation such as
Title VI, Congress's intent must be
"unambiguously" expressed in the
language of the statute. It is the
Department's position that Title VI
does not meet this "clear state-
ment" requirement.
The Department stresses that
Section 601 covers only intentional
discrimination and not disparate
impact claims. It asserts that
Section 601 does not authorize pri-
vate individuals, as opposed to the
federal government, to enforce com-
pliance with the section's require-
ments. With respect to Section 602,
the Department argues that it does
not create any rights at all but
merely delegates rule-making
authority to federal agencies to
effectuate the anti-discrimination
provisions of Section 601. It is the
Department's position that this
"unremarkable grant of authority"
does not authorize federal agencies
to make impermissible by regulation
what Congress has made permissi-
ble by statute.
According to the Department, the
Supreme Court's Title VI decisions
do not support a contrary analysis.
The Department explains that in
Lau, the Supreme Court assumed
that Section 601 barred disparate-
effect as well as intentional-discrim-
ination claims. Since then, the
Department says that the Court has
made clear that Section 601 pro-
scribes only what the Fourteenth
Amendment proscribes-a standard
that does not cover disparate impact
claims.
The Department claims that Section
602 does not establish a different
standard of care from Section 601
but merely allows federal agencies
to "effectuate" Section 601 by pro-
mulgating regulations. According to
the Department, Section 601 does
not authorize federal agencies to
create rules barring disparate effects
arising from generally applicable
state programs that occur "merely
in spite of," rather than "because
of," an individual's national origin.
The Department asserts that an
effort to bar disparate effects arising
from Title VI would not effectuate
the objectives of Title VI but would
rewrite them. The Department
points out that, in other statutory
settings, such as the Americans with
Disabilities Act, when Congress has
intended to apply a disparate-
impact standard, it has specifically
created disparate impact standards.
It is the Department's position that
Section 602 does not offer the
slightest indication that Congress
intended private parties to carry out
the enforcement of the regulations.
The Department argues that all
efforts to bring states into compli-
ance with Section 601 must follow a
detailed procedure established by
Section 602. The Department con-
tends that Congress did not contem-
plate that, in addition to a suspen-
sion of funding after a "hearing" or
some other procedure implemented
by the pertinent federal agency,
there would also be private enforce-
ment actions premised exclusively
on agency regulations. The
Department stresses that Section
602 provides that no enforcement
action shall be taken until the
department or agency concerned
has advised the appropriate person
or persons of the failure to comply
with the requirement and has deter-
mined that compliance cannot be
secured by voluntary means.
Pointing out that the issue is
whether there is an implied private
right of action under Section 602,
Issue No. 4
the Department states that it is not
necessary for the Supreme Court to
invalidate the disparate-impact reg-
ulations in order to reject
Sandoval's claim. The Department
acknowledges that the regulations
might be enforced by executive
branch agencies following the exten-
sive procedural protections
Congress enacted for enforcement
of Title VI.
Under the spending clause of the
U.S. Constitution (Art. I, § 8),
Congress has the authority to attach
conditions on the receipt of federal
funds. South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203 (1987). Because Congress
may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds, it may use
this authority to induce states to
establish programs that it could
not otherwise compel them to
enact. Generally, the states are
given the choice of complying with
the conditions set forth in the legis-
lation or forgoing the benefits of
federal funding.
In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
the Supreme Court held that a
statute that does not explicitly pro-
vide a private right of action may
nevertheless employ such a remedy
in certain circumstances. To create
a private cause of action against
states in the context of spending
clause legislation, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress' intent
must be unambiguously expressed
in the language of the statute. See,
e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203 (1987); Pennhurst State School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981).
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized
an implied private cause of action to
enforce disparate-impact regulations
under Section 602 Title VI in three
other cases in addition to the
Sandoval case. See Burton v. City of
Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175 (11th
Cir. 1999); Elston v. Talladega
County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394
(11th Cir. 1993); Georgia State
Conference of Branches of NAACP
v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir.
1985). Seven other circuits have
suggested that an implied private
cause of action may exist under
Section 602. Latinos Unidos De
Chelsea v. Secretary of Housing &
Development, 799 F.2d 744, 785
n.20 (1st Cir. 1986); New York
Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71
F.3d 1031 (2d Cir.1995); Castenada
by Castenada v. Pickard, 781 F.2d
456, 465 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986);
David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265
(7th Cir.1988); Buchanan v. City of
Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352 (6th Cir.
1996); Larry P by Lucille P v. Riles,
793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984);
Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481
(10th Cir. 1996). However, of these
circuits, only the Third Circuit has
addressed the issue in detail.
The Supreme Court has not yet
squarely addressed the question of
whether a private action may be
used to enforce Title VI. In Lau v.
Nichols, 518 U.S. 187 (1996), the
Court held that HEW regulations,
promulgated pursuant to Section
602 and establishing a disparate-
impact standard, were valid inter-
pretations of Title VI. However, later
Supreme Court decisions have cast
doubt on the continued validity of
Lau and indicate that Title VI must
be held to proscribe only those
racial classifications that would vio-
late the equal protection clause.
See, e.g., United States v. Fordice,
505 U.S. 717 (1992); Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 63
U.S. 582 (1983); Univ. of California
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978). Further, the Supreme Court
has held that the equal protection
clause bans only intentional dis-
crimination and not disparate-
impact discrimination. Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 63 U.S. 582 (1983), was a
decision with six separate opinions.
The lower court had rejected the
plaintiffs' claim that the New York
City police department's entry-level
written examination had a discrimi-
natory impact on them, and they
filed suit on that basis under Title
VI and its implementing regulations.
The Second Circuit rejected the
claim on the theory that Title VI
required proof of discriminatory
intent. Five justices affirmed the
decision in separate opinions and
on a variety of grounds. Justices
White and Rehnquist expressed the
view that there was only a limited
cause of action to enforce Title VI
regulations, reasoning that relief in
private disparate impact actions
should be limited to declaratory and
injunctive relief. Justice Powell and
Chief Justice Burger concurred in
the judgment, concluding that no
private right of action to enforce the
regulations could be implied. Justice
O'Connor concurred in the judg-
ment on the ground that an admin-
istrative agency could not create a
disparate-impact cause of action
under Title VI.
Other Supreme Court cases inter-
preting Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title IX have
implied private rights of action. See,
e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287 (1985) (Section 504); Cannon
v. Univ. Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979) (Title IX). However, none of
these cases involved implied private
rights of action premised on agency
regulations.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case presents the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to
directly address the issue of
whether a private cause of action
for disparate impact can be implied
from administrative regulations pro-
mulgated pursuant to Title VI. The
(Continued on Page 180)
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issue of the legality of English-only
laws and policies is not directly
before the Supreme Court.
The significance of the issue can be
measured by the large number of
amicus briefs in this case. A deci-
sion affirming the Eleventh Circuit's
holding will make it easier for indi-
viduals to obtain relief for race,
color, or national origin discrimina-
tion under Title VI because it would,
among other things, eliminate the
often difficult burden of proving dis-
criminatory intent. Such a decision
would allow private litigants to
recover monetary damages from
governmental agencies in addition
to exposing these agencies to the
risk of losing their federal funding.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision may
have an impact on other federal
laws and regulations in addition to
Title VI cases. According to one
amicus, unless reversed, the
Eleventh Circuit's decision will have
a profoundly adverse impact on
other programs, such as those
established by the federal environ-
mental statutes and administered
primarily by state regulatory agen-
cies, as well as on such activities as
college admissions, intercollegiate
athletics, and public school funding.
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